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The parallel complexity of coloring games ?
Guillaume Ducoffe1
Universite´ Coˆte d’Azur, Inria, CNRS, I3S, France
Abstract. We wish to motivate the problem of finding decentralized
lower-bounds on the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium in
graph games. While the centralized computation of an equilibrium in
polynomial time is generally perceived as a positive result, this does not
reflect well the reality of some applications where the game serves to im-
plement distributed resource allocation algorithms, or to model the social
choices of users with limited memory and computing power. As a case
study, we investigate on the parallel complexity of a game-theoretic varia-
tion of graph coloring. These “coloring games” were shown to capture key
properties of the more general welfare games and Hedonic games. On the
positive side, it can be computed a Nash equilibrium in polynomial-time
for any such game with a local search algorithm. However, the algorithm
is time-consuming and it requires polynomial space. The latter questions
the use of coloring games in the modeling of information-propagation in
social networks. We prove that the problem of computing a Nash equi-
librium in a given coloring game is PTIME-hard, and so, it is unlikely
that one can be computed with an efficient distributed algorithm. The
latter brings more insights on the complexity of these games.
1 Introduction
In algorithmic game theory, it is often the case that a problem is considered
“tractable” when it can be solved in polynomial time, and “difficult” only when
it is NP-hard or it is PLS-hard to find a solution. On the other hand, with
the growing size of real networks, it has become a boiling topic in (non game-
theoretic) algorithmic to study on the finer-grained complexity of polynomial
problems [16]. In our opinion, the same should apply to graph games when they
serve as a basis for new distributed algorithms. We propose to do so in some
cases when it can be easily computed a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
The following case study will make use of well-established parallel and space
complexity classes to better understand the hardness of a given graph game.
Precisely, we investigate on a “coloring game”, first introduced in [14] in order
to unify classical upper-bounds on the chromatic number. Since then it has been
rediscovered many times, attracting attention on the way in the study of infor-
mation propagation in wireless sensor networks [4] and in social networks [12].
We choose to consider this game since it is a good representative of the separa-
ble welfare games – proposed in [13] as a game-theoretic toolkit for distributed
?
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resource allocation algorithms – and the additively separable symmetric Hedonic
games [3]. A coloring game is played on an undirected graph with each vertex
being an agent (formal definitions will be given in the technical sections of the
paper). Agents must choose a colour in order to construct a proper coloring of
the graph. The individual goal of each agent is to maximize the number of agents
with the same colour as hers. Furthermore, it can always be computed a Nash
equilibrium in polynomial time with a simple local-search algorithm [6, 12, 14].
However, for n-vertex m-edge graphs, the above-mentioned algorithm has
O(m+n√n)-time complexity and O(n+m)-space complexity. Therefore, when
the graph gets larger, potential applications of coloring games as a computational
mechanism design (e.g., in order to assign frequencies in sensor networks in
a distributed fashion, or to model the behaviour of social network users with
limited power and storage) can be questioned. In particular, the authors in [11]
report on the limited abilities of human subject networks to solve a coloring
problem. In this note, we will investigate on the belonging of our problem –
the computation of a Nash equilibrium in coloring games – to some complexity
classes that are related to parallel and space complexity. Our goal in doing so is
to bring more insights on the complexity of the problem.
Related work. Apart from lower-bounds in communication complexity [7], we are
not aware of any analysis of decentralized complexity in game theory. Closest to
our work are the studies on the sequential complexity of Hedonic games. Deciding
whether a given Hedonic game admits a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete [1].
Every additively separable symmetric Hedonic games has a Nash equilibrium
but it is PLS-complete to compute one [8]. Coloring games are a strict subclass
where the local-search algorithm terminates on a Nash equilibrium within a
polynomial number of steps. We will go one step further by considering their
parallel complexity, something we think we are the first to study.
In [4], they introduced a distributed algorithm in order to compute the Nash
equilibrium of a given coloring game. Their algorithm is a natural variation of the
classical local-search algorithm for the problem, however, it does not speed up the
computation of equilibria (at least theoretically). In addition, each agent needs to
store locally the colouring of the graph at any given step, that implies quadratic
space and communication complexity. Additional related work is [6, 12], where
it is studied the number of steps of more elaborate local-search algorithms when
up to k players are allowed to collude at each step. Informally, collusion means
that the players can simultaneously change their colours for the same new colour
provided they all benefit from the process (note that the classical local-search
algorithm corresponds to the case k = 1).
Contributions. We prove that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a
given coloring game is PTIME-hard (Theorem 2). This is hint that the problem is
inherently sequential, i.e., it is unlikely the computation of an equilibrium can be
sped up significantly on a parallel machine with polynomially many processors.
In particular, our negative result applies to the distributed setting since any
distributed algorithm on graphs can be simulated on a parallel machine with
one processor per edge and per vertex. By a well-known relationship between
space and parallel complexity [15], Theorem 2 also extends to show that no
space efficient algorithm for the problem (say, within logarithmic workspace)
can exist. Altogether, this may be hint that coloring games are a too powerful
computational mechanism design for “lightweight” distributed applications.
Our reduction is from the standard Monotone Circuit Value problem.
However, the gadgets needed are technically challenging, and we will need to
leverage nontrivial properties of coloring games in order to prove its correctness.
Definitions and useful background will be given in Section 2. We will detail our
reduction in Section 3 before concluding this paper in Section 4.
2 Definitions and notations
We use the graph terminology from [2]. Graphs in this study are finite, simple,
and unweighted.
Coloring games. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A coloring of G assigns a positive
integer, taken in the range {1, . . . , n}, to each of the n vertices in V . For every
i, let Li be the subset of vertices coloured i. We name Li a colour class in what
follows. Nonempty colour classes partition the vertex set V . The partition is a
proper coloring when no two adjacent vertices are assigned the same colour, i.e.,
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for every u, v ∈ Li, {u, v} /∈ E.
Fig. 1. Proper coloring of a graph G. Each colour class is represented by an ellipse.
Every agent receives unit payoff.
Every graph G defines a coloring game whose n agents are the vertices in
V . The strategy of an agent is her colour. Furthermore, every v ∈ Li receives
payoff: −1 if there is u ∈ Li s.t. {u, v} ∈ E (in which case, the coloring is not
proper), and |Li| − 1 otherwise. We refer to Figure 1 for an illustration. Finally,
a Nash equilibrium of the coloring game is any coloring of G where no agent can
increase her payoff by changing her strategy. In particular, the proper coloring in
Figure 1 is a Nash equilibrium. More generally, observe that a Nash equilibrium
in this game is always a proper coloring of G. In what follows, we will focus on
the computation of Nash equilibria in coloring games.
Theorem 1 ( [6, 12]). For any coloring game that is specified by an n-vertex
m-edge graph G = (V,E), a Nash equilibrium can be computed in O(m+ n√n)-
time and O(n + m)-space.
Parallel complexity. Computations are performed on a parallel random-access
machine (PRAM, see [9]) with an unlimited amount of processors. However, as
stated in the conclusion, our results also apply to more realistic parallel complex-
ity classes. In what follows, we will use the fact that processors are numbered.
We will handle with read/write conflicts between processors with the strategy
CREW-PRAM (concurrent read, exclusive write). Let PTIME contain the deci-
sion problems that can be solved in sequential polynomial-time (that is, with a
single processor). Problem A reduces to problem B if given an oracle to solve B,
A can be solved in polylogarithmic-time with a polynomial number of processors.
In particular, a problem B is PTIME-hard if every problem in PTIME reduces
to B (this is formally defined as quasi-PTIME-hardness in [9]). Such reductions
are finer-grained than the more standard logspace reductions.
3 Main Result
Theorem 2. Computing a Nash equilibrium for coloring games is PTIME-hard.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we will reduce from a variation of the well-
known Monotone Circuit Value problem, defined as follows.
Problem 1 (Monotone Circuit Value).
Input: A boolean circuit C with m gates and n entries, a word w ∈ {0, 1}n
such that:
– the gates are either AND-gates or OR-gates;
– every gate has exactly two entries (in-degree two);
– a topological ordering of the gates is given, with the mth gate being
the output gate.
Question: Does C output 1 when it takes w as input ?
Monotone Circuit Value is proved to be PTIME-complete in [9].
3.1 The reduction
Let 〈C, w〉 be any instance of Monotone Circuit Value. We will reduce it to
a coloring game as follows. Let G := (g1, g2, . . . , gm) be the gates of the circuit,
that are topologically ordered.
Construction of the gate-gadgets. For every 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the jth gate will be
simulated by a subgraph Gj = (Vj , Ej) with 12(n + j)− 9 vertices. We refer to
Figure 2 for an illustration. Let us give some intuition for the following construc-
tion of Gj . We aim at simulating the computation of the (binary) output of all
the gates in C when it takes w as input. To do that, given a supergraph G of Gj
(to be defined later), and a fixed Nash equilibrium for the coloring game that is
defined on G, we aim at guessing the output of the jth gate from the subcolor-
ing of Gj . More precisely, the subcoloring will encode a “local certificate” that
indicates which values on the two entries of gj cause the output.
Observe that to certify that an OR-gate outputs 1, it suffices to show that it
receives 1 on any one of its two entries, whereas for an AND-gate it requires to
show that it outputs 1 on its two entries. Since by de Morgan’s laws, the negation
of an AND-gate can be transformed into an OR-gate and vice-versa, therefore,
we need to distinguish between three cases in order to certify the output of
the gate. So, the vertices in Vj are partitioned in three subsets of equal size
4(n + j) − 3, denoted by V 1j , V 2j , V 3j . Furthermore, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ 3, every
vertex in V tj is adjacent to every vertex in Vj \ V tj .
Fig. 2. Gadget subgraph Gj representing the j
th gate. An edge between two subsets of
vertices (delimited by an ellipse) denotes the existence of a complete bipartite subgraph.
Let us now describe the structure of the three (isomorphic) subgraphs Gj [V
t
j ] =
(V tj , E
t
j) with 1 ≤ t ≤ 3. Informally, we will need this internal structure in order
to ensure that every of the three subsets V tj will behave as a “truthful” certificate
to decide on the output of the gate; i.e., only a few vertices of Vj will be used to
certify the output of the jth gate, while all others will be divided into artificial
aggregates that we name “private groups” whose role is to ensure “truthful-
ness” of the certificate (this will be made clearer in the following). There are
two nonadjacent vertices atj , b
t
j ∈ V tj playing a special role. The other vertices in
V tj \ {atj , btj} are partitioned in two subsets Atj , Btj of respective size 2(n+ j)− 3
and 2(n+ j)− 2. The sets Atj , Btj are called the private groups of atj , btj . Further-
more, every vertex in Atj is adjacent to every vertex in V
t
j \ (Atj ∪{atj}), similarly
every vertex in Btj is adjacent to every vertex in V
t
j \ (Btj ∪ {btj}).
Since all edges are defined above independently the one from the other, the
graph Gj [V
1
j ] = (V
1
j , E
1
j ) (encoded by its adjacency lists) can be constructed
with |V 1j | + |E1j | = 4(n + j)2 − 2(n + j) − 2 processors simply by assigning
the construction of each vertex and each edge to a different processor. Note that
each processor can decide on the vertex, resp. the edge, it needs to compute from
its number. Overall, it takes O(log(n+ j))-time in order to construct Gj [V 1j ] in
parallel. The latter can be easily generalized in order to construct Gj inO(log(n+
j))-time with |Vj |+|Ej | processors. Therefore, the graphs G1, G2, . . . , Gm can be
constructed in parallel in O(log(n+m))-time with ∑mj=1(|Vj |+ |Ej |) processors,
that is polynomial in n + m.
Construction of the graph. Let X = {x1, x′1, . . . , xi, x′i, . . . , xn, x′n} contain 2n
nonadjacent vertices, that are two vertices per letter in the binary word w. The
graph G = (V,E) for the reduction has vertex-set V = X ∪
(⋃m
j=1 Vj
)
. In
particular, it has 2n − 9m + 6m(m + 2n + 1) vertices. Furthermore, G[Vj ] is
isomorphic to Gj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m. In order to complete our reduction, let
us now describe how our gadgets are connected the one with the other.
For technical reasons, we will need to make adjacent every vertex in the
private group Atj (resp. B
t
j), with 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ 3, to every vertex
in V \ Vj . By doing so, note that every vertex in V \ (Atj ∪ {atj}) is adjacent to
every vertex in Atj (resp., every vertex in V \ (Btj ∪ {btj}) is adjacent to every
vertex in Btj). Furthermore, each edge is defined independently the one from
the other. Hence, similarly as above,
∑m
j=1
∑3
t=1(|Atj |+ |Btj |)|V \ Vj | processors
are sufficient in order to construct these edges in O(log(n + m))-time, that is
polynomial in n + m.
Fig. 3. Edges in G to simulate the two connections of an AND-gate in the circuit.
Finally, we recall that for every j, there are three cases to distinguish in or-
der to decide on the output of the jth gate, with each case being represented
with some subset V tj . The union of subsets representing a positive certificate
(output 1) is named Yj , while the union of those representing a negative certifi-
cate (output 0) is named Nj . In particular, if the j
th gate is an OR-gate, let
Yj := {a1j , b1j , a2j , b2j} and Nj := {a3j , b3j} (it suffices to receive 1 on one input).
Else, the jth gate is an AND-gate, so, let Yj := {a1j , b1j} and Nj := {a2j , b2j , a3j , b3j}.
Suppose the jth gate is an OR-gate (the case when it is an AND-gate follows
by symmetry, up to interverting Yj with Nj , see also Figure 3). Let us consider
the first entry of the gate. There are two cases. Suppose that it is the ith entry
of the circuit, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If wi = 0 then we make both xi, x′i adjacent
to both a1j , b
1
j ; else, wi = 1, we make both xi, x
′
i adjacent to both a
3
j , b
3
j . Else,
the entry is some other gate of the circuit, and so, since gates are topologically
ordered, it is the kth gate for some k < j. We make every vertex in Nk adjacent
to both a1j , b
1
j , and we make every vertex in Yk adjacent to both a
3
j , b
3
j .
The second entry of the gate is similarly considered, up to replacing above
the two vertices a1j , b
1
j with a
2
j , b
2
j . We refer to Figure 3 for an illustration. In
particular, observe that there is only a constant number of edges that are added
at this step for each gate. Furthermore, the construction of these new edges only
requires to read the two in-neighbours of the gate in the circuit C. As a result,
the last step can be done in parallel in O(log(n + m))-time with m processors.
3.2 Structure of a Nash equilibrium
The graph G = (V,E) of our reduction (constructed in Section 3.1) defines a
coloring game. Let us fix any Nash equilibrium for this game (that exists by
Theorem 1). We will show that it is sufficient to know the colour of every vertex
in Ym∪Nm in order to decide on the output of the circuit C (recall that the mth
gate is the output gate). To prove it, we will need the following technical claims
in order to gain more insights on the structure of the equilibrium.
Fig. 4. A boolean circuit (left) with a Nash equilibrium of the coloring game from our
reduction (right). Each colour class is represented with an ellipse. Intuitively, vertices
in the central colour class simulate the computation of the output. Other colour classes
contain a private group and they are “inactive”.
More precisely, we will prove that there are exactly 6m + 1 colour classes,
that are one colour class per private group Atj or B
t
j and an additional colour
for the vertices in X. The intuition is that there are 2(n + m) vertices in one
special colour class (including X) that simulates the computation of the output
of C, whereas all other vertices are “trapped” with the vertices in their respective
private group. We refer to Figure 4 for an illustration.
Claim 1. For every j, any colour class does not contain more than two vertices
in every Yj ∪Nj. Furthermore, if it contains exactly two vertices in Yj ∪Nj then
these are atj , b
t
j for some 1 ≤ t ≤ 3.
Proof. A Nash equilibrium is a proper coloring of G. Therefore, since any two
vertices in different subsets among V 1j , V
2
j , V
3
j are adjacent by construction,
they cannot have the same colour. Since Yj ∪ Nj = {a1j , b1j , a2j , b2j , a3j , b3j} and
atj , b
t
j ∈ V tj for every 1 ≤ t ≤ 3, the claim follows directly. 
Claim 2. Any two vertices that are in a same private group have the same
colour. Similarly, xi and x
′
i have the same colour for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Let S be either a private group (S = Atj or S = B
t
j for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m
and 1 ≤ t ≤ 3), or a pair representing the same letter of word w (i.e., S = {xi, x′i}
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let v ∈ S maximize her payoff and let c be her colour. Note
that v receives payoff |Lc|− 1 with Lc being the colour class composed of all the
vertices with colour c. Furthermore, every u ∈ S receives payoff lower than or
equal to |Lc| − 1 by the choice of v. In such case, every u ∈ S must be coloured
c, or else, since the adjacency and the nonadjacency relations are the same for
u and v (they are twins), furthermore u, v are nonadjacent, the agent u would
increase her payoff to |Lc| by choosing c as her new colour, thus contradicting
the hypothesis that we are in a Nash equilibrium. 
The argument we use in Claim 2 is that twin vertices must have the same
colour. In what follows, we will use the same argument under different disguises.
Claim 3. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ 3. Either Atj or Atj ∪ {atj} is a colour
class, and in the same way either Btj or B
t
j∪{btj} is a colour class. Furthermore,
either Btj ∪ {btj} is a colour class, or atj and btj have the same colour.
Proof. Recall that a Nash equilibrium is a proper coloring of G. Since atj is the
only vertex in V \Atj that is nonadjacent to Atj , furthermore every two vertices in
Atj have the same colour by Claim 2, therefore, either A
t
j or A
t
j ∪{atj} is a colour
class. Similarly, either Btj or B
t
j ∪ {btj} is a colour class. In particular, suppose
that btj does not have the same colour as her private group. Then, she must
receive payoff at least |Btj | = 2(n+ j)− 2 (else, she would increase her payoff by
choosing the same colour as her private group, thus contradicting the hypothesis
that we are in a Nash equilibrium). Furthermore, there can be only vertices in
V \ (Atj ∪Btj) with the same colour c as btj . Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that atj does not have colour c. There are two cases to be considered.
Suppose that Atj ∪ {atj} is a colour class. Then, atj receives payoff |Atj | =
2(n + j) − 3. In such case, since atj and btj are twin vertices in G \ (Atj ∪ Btj),
vertex atj could increase her payoff to at least 2(n + j)− 1 by choosing c as her
new colour, thus contradicting the hypothesis that we are in a Nash equilibrium.
Else, atj and b
t
j do not have the same colours as their respective private
groups. In such case, Atj and B
t
j are colour classes, hence we can constrain
ourselves to the subgraph G \ (Atj ∪ Btj). In particular, the constriction of the
Nash equilibrium to the subgraph must be a Nash equilibrium of the coloring
game defined on G\ (Atj ∪Btj). Since atj and btj are twin vertices in G\ (Atj ∪Btj),
they must have the same colour by a similar argument as for Claim 2.
As a result, atj must have colour c in both cases, that proves the claim. 
We recall that we aim at simulating the computation of the output of all
the gates in C. To do that, we will prove the existence of a special colour class
containing X and some pair in Yj ∪Nj for every j. Intuitively, the two vertices
of Yj ∪Nj are used to certify the output of the jth gate. However, this certificate
is “local” in the sense that it assumes the output of the j − 1 smaller gates to
be already certified. Therefore, we need to prove that there can be no “missing
gate”, i.e., every gate is represented in the special colour class.
Claim 4. Let c be a colour such that Lc 6⊆ X and Lc does not intersect any
private group (Atj or B
t
j for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ t ≤ 3).
Then, X ⊆ Lc and there exists an index j0 such that the following holds true:
|Lc ∩ (Yj ∪ Nj)| = 2 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ j0, and Lc ∩ (Yj ∪ Nj) = ∅ for every
j0 + 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Proof. By the hypothesis Lc 6⊆ X and Lc does not intersect any private group, so,
there is at least one vertex of
⋃m
j=1(Yj ∪Nj) with colour c. Let j0 be the largest
index j such that there is a vertex in Yj ∪Nj with colour c. Since by Claim 1,
there can be no more than two vertices of Yj ∪ Nj that are in Lc for every j,
therefore, by maximality of j0 we get |Lc| ≤ |X|+ 2j0 = 2(n+ j0). In particular,
observe that if |Lc| = 2(n + j0) then X ⊆ Lc and for every 1 ≤ j ≤ j0 there are
exactly two vertices in Yj∪Nj with colour c. So, let us prove that |Lc| = 2(n+j0),
that will prove the claim. By the choice of j0, there is some 1 ≤ t ≤ 3 such that
atj0 ∈ Lc or btj0 ∈ Lc. In particular, |Lc| ≥ min{|Atj0 |, |Btj0 |}+ 1 = 2(n + j0)− 2
or else, every vertex vtj0 ∈ Lc ∩ {atj0 , btj0} would increase her payoff by choosing
the colour of the vertices in her private group (that is a colour class by Claim 3),
thus contradicting the hypothesis that we are in a Nash equilibrium.
We prove as an intermediate subclaim that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ j0 − 1 such that
Lc∩(Yj∪Nj) 6= ∅, there is some 1 ≤ t′ ≤ 3 such that at′j , bt
′
j ∈ Lc. Indeed, in this
situation, there is some t′ such that at
′
j ∈ Lc or bt
′
j ∈ Lc. If bt
′
j ∈ Lc then we are
done as by Claim 3, at
′
j ∈ Lc. Otherwise, bt
′
j /∈ Lc and we prove this case cannot
happen. First observe that at
′
j ∈ Lc in this case. Furthermore, since at
′
j and b
t′
j
do not have the same colour we have by Claim 3 that Bt
′
j ∪{bt
′
j } is a colour class.
In this situation, bt
′
j receives payoff 2(n+ j)− 2 ≤ 2(n+ j0− 1)− 2 < |Lc|. Since
in addition at
′
j and b
t′
j are twins in G \ (At
′
j ∪Bt
′
j ), vertex b
t′
j could increase her
payoff by choosing colour c, thus contradicting that we are in a Nash equilibrium.
This proves at
′
j , b
t′
j ∈ Lc, and so, the subclaim.
By the subclaim, there is an even number 2k of vertices in
⋃j0−1
j=1 (Yj ∪ Nj)
with colour c, for some k ≤ j0− 1. Similarly, since by Claim 2 the vertices xi, x′i
have the same colour for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, |X ∩ Lc| = 2n′ for some n′ ≤ n. Now
there are two cases to be considered.
Suppose that btj0 ∈ Lc. Then, by Claim 3 atj0 ∈ Lc. Furthermore |Lc| ≥
2(n+ j0)− 1 or else, vertex btj0 would increase her payoff by choosing the colour
of the vertices in Btj0 (that is a colour class by Claim 3), thus contradicting the
hypothesis that we are in a Nash equilibrium. As a result, |Lc| = 2(n′+k+ 1) ≥
2(n+j0)−1, that implies n′+k ≥ n+j0−1, and so, |Lc| ≥ 2(n+j0), as desired.
Else, btj0 /∈ Lc and we prove this case cannot happen. First observe that
atj0 ∈ Lc. Furthermore, |Lc| = 2(n′ + k) + 1 ≥ 2(n + j0) − 2, that implies
n′ + k ≥ n + j0 − 1, and so, |Lc| ≥ 2(n + j0)− 1. However, since atj0 and btj0 do
not have the same colour, Btj0 ∪{btj0} is a colour class by Claim 3. In particular,
btj0 receives payoff 2(n+ j0)−2 < |Lc|. Since atj0 , btj0 are twins in G\ (Atj0 ∪Btj0),
vertex btj0 could increase her payoff by choosing colour c, thus contradicting that
we are in a Nash equilibrium.
Altogether, |Lc| ≥ 2(n + j0), that proves the claim. 
We point out that by combining Claim 1 with Claim 4, one obtains that for
every 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there are either zero or two vertices in Yj ∪Nj in each colour
class not containing a private group, and in case there are two vertices then these
are atj , b
t
j for some 1 ≤ t ≤ 3.
Claim 5. Any two vertices in X have the same colour. Furthermore, for every
1 ≤ j ≤ m, every vertex in Yj ∪Nj either has the same colour as vertices in X
or as vertices in her private group.
Proof. Let Lc be any colour class with at least one vertex in
⋃m
j=1(Yj ∪Nj). Let
j0 be the largest index j such that there is a vertex in Yj ∪ Nj with colour c.
In order to prove the claim, there are two cases to be considered. Suppose that
Lc 6= Atj0 ∪ {atj0} and Lc 6= Btj0 ∪ {btj0} for any 1 ≤ t ≤ 3. We will prove that
X ⊆ Lc, that will imply that Lc is unique in such a case, and so, will prove the
claim. By the choice of colour c, Lc 6⊆ X. Further, observe that there can be no
private group with a vertex in Lc. As a result, this case follows directly from
Claim 4.
Else, either Lc = A
t
j0
∪ {atj0} or Lc = Btj0 ∪ {btj0} for some 1 ≤ t ≤ 3, and we
may assume that it is the case for any colour class Lc that contains at least one
vertex in
⋃m
j=1(Yj ∪ Nj) (or else, we are back to the previous case). So, let us
constrain ourselves to the subgraph G[X]. In particular, the constriction of the
Nash equilibrium to the subgraph must be a Nash equilibrium of the coloring
game defined on G[X]. Since the vertices in X are pairwise nonadjacent, they
must form a unique colour class in such case, that proves the claim. 
We will need a “truthfulness” property to prove correctness of our reduction.
Namely, the value of the output of any gate in the circuit must be correctly
guessed from the agents with the same colour as vertices in X.
Claim 6. Let 1 ≤ j0 ≤ m such that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ j0, there is at least one
vertex in Yj ∪ Nj with the same colour c0 as all vertices in X. Then for every
1 ≤ j ≤ j0, Lc0 ∩ Yj 6= ∅ if and only if the output of the jth gate is 1.
Proof. In order to prove the claim by contradiction, let 1 ≤ j1 ≤ j0 be the
smallest index j such that either Yj ∩ Lc0 = ∅ and the output of the jth gate
is 1 (false negative) or Yj ∩ Lc0 6= ∅ and the output of the jth gate is 0 (false
positive). We will show that in such case, there is an edge with two endpoints
of colour c0, hence the coloring is not proper, thus contradicting the hypothesis
that we are in a Nash equilibrium. Note that since by de Morgan’s laws, the
negation of an AND-gate can be transformed into an OR-gate and vice-versa,
both cases are symmetrical, and so, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the jth1 gate is
an OR-gate. There are two subcases to be considered.
Suppose that the output of the jth1 gate is 0 (false positive). In such case,
Yj1 ∩ Lc0 6= ∅. Let us consider the first entry of the gate. If it is the ith entry of
the circuit for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n then wi = 0 (because the output of the jth1 gate is
0) and so, by construction, xi, x
′
i ∈ Lc0 are adjacent to a1j1 , b1j1 . Else, it is the kth
gate of the circuit for some k < j1. By minimality of j1, since the output of the
kth gate must be 0 (because the output of the jth1 gate is 0), Yk ∩ Lc0 = ∅, and
so, Nk ∩ Lc0 6= ∅. By construction, every vertex in Nk is adjacent to a1j1 , b1j1 . As
a result, a1j1 , b
1
j1
have a neighbour in Lc0 in this subcase. We can prove similarly
(by considering the second entry of the gate) that a2j1 , b
2
j1
have a neighbour in Lc0
in this subcase. The latter implies the existence of an edge with both endpoints
in Lc0 since Yj1 = {a1j1 , b1j1 , a2j1 , b2j1}.
Else, the output of the jth1 gate is 1 (false negative). In such case, Yj1∩Lc0 = ∅,
hence Nj1 ∩ Lc0 6= ∅. Since the output of the gate is 1, there must be an entry
of the gate such that: either it is the ith entry of the circuit for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and wi = 1 (in which case, the two vertices xi, x
′
i ∈ Lc0 are adjacent to both
a3j1 , b
3
j1
by construction); or it is the kth gate of the circuit for some k < j1 and
this gate outputs 1. In the latter case, by minimality of j1, Yk ∩ Lc0 6= ∅. By
construction, every vertex in Yk is adjacent to a
3
j1
, b3j1 . As a result, a
3
j1
, b3j1 have
a neighbour in Lc0 in this subcase. The latter implies the existence of an edge
with both endpoints in Lc0 since Nj1 = {a3j1 , b3j1}. 
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Let 〈C, w〉 be any instance of Monotone Circuit Value.
Let G = (V,E) be the graph obtained with our reduction from Section 3.1,
which can be constructed in polylogarithmic-time with a polynomial number of
processors. The graph G defines a coloring game. We fix any Nash equilibrium
for this game, that exists by Theorem 1. By Claim 5, any two vertices in X have
the same colour c0. We will prove that there is at least one vertex in Ym with
colour c0 if and only if the circuit C outputs 1 when it takes w as input. Since
Monotone Circuit Value is PTIME-complete [9], the latter will prove that
computing a Nash equilibrium for coloring games is PTIME-hard.
By Claim 6, we only need to prove that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there is at
least one vertex in Yj ∪Nj with colour c0. To prove it by contradiction, let j0 be
the smallest index j such that no vertex in Yj ∪Nj has colour c0. By Claim 5,
every vertex in Yj0 ∪Nj0 has the same colour as her private group. In particular,
the three of a1j0 , a
2
j0
, a3j0 receive payoff 2(n + j0) − 3. We will prove that one of
these three agents could increase her payoff by choosing c0 as her new colour,
thus contradicting that we are in a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, by the minimality
of j0, it follows by Claim 4 that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ j0 − 1, there are exactly two
vertices of Yj ∪Nj with colour c0, while for every j0 ≤ j ≤ m there is no vertex
in Yj ∪Nj with colour c0. As a result, |Lc0 | = 2(n + j0) − 2. In particular, any
agent among a1j0 , a
2
j0
, a3j0 could increase her payoff by choosing c0 as her new
colour — provided she is nonadjacent to every vertex in Lc0 . We will show it
is the case for at least one of the three vertices, that will conclude the proof
of the theorem. Assume w.l.o.g. that the jth0 gate is an OR-gate (indeed, since
by de Morgan’s laws, the negation of an AND-gate can be transformed into an
OR-gate and vice-versa, both cases are symmetrical). There are two cases.
Suppose that the output of the jth0 gate is 1. In such case, there must be an
entry of the gate such that: it is the ith entry of the circuit, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and wi = 1; or it is the k
th gate of the circuit for some k < j0 and the output
of that gate is 1. In the latter case, we have by Claim 6 that the two vertices
of Yk ∪ Nk with colour c0 are in the set Yk. Assume w.l.o.g. that the above-
mentioned entry is the first entry of the gate. By construction, the two vertices
a1j0 , b
1
j0
are nonadjacent to every vertex in Lc0 . Else, the output of the j
th
0 gate is
0. Therefore, for every entry of the gate: either it is the ith entry of the circuit,
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and wi = 0; or it is the kth gate of the circuit for some k < j0
and the output of that gate is 0. In the latter case, we have by Claim 6 that
the two vertices of Yk ∪ Nk with colour c0 are in the set Nk. By construction,
the two vertices a3j0 , b
3
j0
are nonadjacent to every vertex in Lc0 . In both cases, it
contradicts that we are in a Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
4 Conclusion and open perspectives
We suggest through this case study a more in-depth analysis of the complexity
of computational mechanism designs. We would find it interesting to pursue
similar investigations for other games. Experiments in the spirit of [11] could be
helpful for our purposes. Further, we note that PRAM is seen by some as a too
unrealistic model for parallel computation. Thus, one may argue that proving
our reduction in this model casts a doubt on its reach. However, we can leverage
on the stronger statement that Monotone Circuit Value is strictly PTIME-
hard [5]. It implies roughly that the sequential time and the parallel time to solve
this problem cannot differ by more than a moderate polynomial-factor (unless
the solving of all problems in PTIME can be sped up on a parallel machine
by at least a polynomial-factor). Our reduction directly shows the same holds
true for the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a given coloring game,
that generalizes our hardness result to more recent parallel complexity classes
(e.g., [10]).
References
1. C. Ballester. NP-completeness in hedonic games. Games and Economic Behavior,
49(1):1–30, 2004.
2. J. A. Bondy and U. S. R. Murty. Graph theory. Grad. Texts in Math., 2008.
3. N. Burani and W. S. Zwicker. Coalition formation games with separable prefer-
ences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 45(1):27–52, 2003.
4. I. Chatzigiannakis, C. Koninis, P. N. Panagopoulou, and P. G. Spirakis. Distributed
game-theoretic vertex coloring. In OPODIS’10, pages 103–118.
5. A. Condon. A theory of strict P-completeness. Computational Complexity,
4(3):220–241, 1994.
6. G. Ducoffe, D. Mazauric, and A. Chaintreau. The complexity of hedonic coalitions
under bounded cooperation. Submitted.
7. J. Feigenbaum, C. H. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker. Sharing the cost of multicast
transmissions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 63(1):21–41, 2001.
8. M. Gairing and R. Savani. Computing stable outcomes in hedonic games. In
SAGT’10, pages 174–185.
9. R. Greenlaw, H. J. Hoover, and W. L. Ruzzo. Limits to parallel computation:
P-completeness theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.
10. H. Karloff, S. Suri, and S. Vassilvitskii. A model of computation for MapReduce.
In SODA’10, pages 938–948.
11. M. Kearns, S. Suri, and N. Montfort. An experimental study of the coloring
problem on human subject networks. Science, 313(5788):824–827, 2006.
12. J. Kleinberg and K. Ligett. Information-sharing in social networks. Games and
Economic Behavior, 82:702–716, 2013.
13. J. R. Marden and A. Wierman. Distributed welfare games. Operations Research,
61(1):155–168, 2013.
14. P. N. Panagopoulou and P. G. Spirakis. A game theoretic approach for efficient
graph coloring. In ISAAC’08, pages 183–195.
15. C. H. Papadimitriou. Computational complexity. John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2003.
16. V. Vassilevska Williams. Fine-Grained Algorithms and Complexity (Invited Talk).
In STACS’16.
